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Introduction
In regions historically troubled by civil wars and ethnic based conflict violence often erupts abruptly and severely. In such cases, peacemakers and politicians often follow unconditional paths to prevent a conflict from escalating into a full-fledged war. These various paths towards conflict resolution through constitution redesigning have provoked scholars and practitioners to devise "best practice" concepts. It has become increasingly important for practitioners to draw on synthesized conceptual approaches before designing constitutional structures that have long-term implications. Moreover, there is a need for future designs to build on previous successes and avoid missteps. In a rush for "conflict freezing", as it will be discussed in this article, constitutional arrangements contained in peace agreements often underestimate the complexity of conflicting issues at stake, both in goal setting, procedural dynamics and substantial endurance. When setting the goals, agreements ought to realistically target the context. In order for that to be achieved, processes of agreement drafting should include a plethora of societal actors in order to set an agreed upon base for reforms. Conversely, top-down procedures in drafting tend to achieve some, but not all of the goals that have been set. In essence, the lack of actors' participation in the procedural dynamics complicates subsequent implementation phase, which would lack local ownership.
Authors have devised the goals that are usually set in post-conflict constitution designs by analyzing large data pools of post-conflict constitutions and peace agreements. Widner (2008) discusses "three sets of ambitions". The first set entails durability of the agreement, followed by the reduction of violence and increase in civility, which allows for institutionalization of the conflict. The third ambition underlines the importance of agreement's self-enforcement in the future. Bearing in mind that every process varies, there is a wide-spread urge for the design drafting to entail sense of inclusion and trust. "Constitution makers must find a way to reconcile the need to tie in powerful elites with the demand for a consultative process that fosters political dialogue and empowers the people" (Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth 2006) .
In unfolding the argument, the article presents the dilemmas of the the Ohrid Framework Agreement 1 , regarding the limits of the constitutionalinstitutional engineering.
In that sense, we analyze the most prominent spheres of influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in the Macedonian post-conflict constitutional state structure. The Agreement's widely appreciated as a basis for the creation of a functioning multiethnic society, and a criterion for the Macedonian integration in the EuroAtlantic institutions. However, while the Agreement should be praised for these aspects, its problematic implications should not be underestimated.
In procedural sense, the Agreement, through its imprecise terminology hindered its own implementation. Being a peace agreement, OFA determined in detail the processes and provisions of the constitutional remaking, not allowing for an inclusive drafting process. In that way, a political agreement dominated over the only constitutional body that directly represents the citizens in the country. As discussed later, the agreement transcended general goals of peace agreements -to bring about end to violence and allow for institutionalization of conflict -and set forth all-encompassing goals. In substantial sense, the Agreement overestimated the ability of the Macedonian society to absorb its goals and provisions by introducing the paradigm of the "spirit" of the agreement.
This has made OFA's implementation prone to political infringements and biased evaluation.
In unfolding the argument, the article describes the socio-political context prior to the conflict of 2001. Then, it analyzes the structural remaking envisioned in the Ohrid Framework Agreement with the constitutional amendments adopted in November, 2001 . Subsequently, the article describes the implications of the implemented provisions, both in terms of process and substance. Finally, the argumentation offers a perspective on the possible lessons that can be learned for future post-conflict constitutional designs, as well as some thoughts on the development of the Macedonian political system.
1
In the text the terms "the Ohrid Framework Agreement", "the OFA", "the Ohrid Agreement" or "the Agreement" are used interchangeably.
Macedonia Leading up to the 2001 Conflict
On 8 September 1991, amidst the socio-political disintegration of Socialist
Yugoslavia, Macedonian citizens laid the grounds for an independent
Republic of Macedonia through a popular referendum. On 17 November 1991, the Assembly adopted a new constitution, which promoted
Macedonia's independence, sovereignty and democratic character.
On the international scene, however, the path towards recognition was obstructed, largely because of the problem with neighbors' unwillingness to accept the name of the country 2 .
For ten years, the international community perceived and structural injustices. The Constitution, while establishing a liberal democracy and proclaiming fundamental human rights and freedoms, was insufficiently inclusive for the ethnic minorities. That lack of inclusion was especially felt in the realm of the use of another language in official communication, which was allowed only where other nationalities were a large majority strictly on local level. Also, the central position of the Macedonians as a constituent people of the country was seen as ethnocentric, a notion that was invigorated by the promotion of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a confessional leader of the country.
As a result, Albanian political parties boycotted the Referendum and the constitution adoption. They organized a parallel referendum asking for autonomy of Western Macedonia. The ethnic majority, overwhelmed by the historic moment of the Macedonian independence, was not alarmed by the isolation of the Albanian population. Only in the aftermath of the conflict it was understood that the Constitution was embedded with these structural injustices, making it a casus belli.
Second, there was a systemic fault in the structure of state institutions, which accentuated the social injustices. The public administration was not designed to represent the societal multiethnic conglomerate, especially in the use of language, education, and structure. There were issues with the participation of Albanians in the school system and their right to mother- on Kosovo, expressed their irredentist and overtly nationalistic territorial claims. Their proclaimed goal was the "re-creation of Great Albania" ("Ilirida"), which would include the western part of Macedonia, Albania, Macedonia's existence. Then, the goal was to guarantee and develop its democratic future by assisting its integration to the Euro-Atlantic institutions and promoting ethnic diversity. Evidently, the goals of the peace framework strived for more than peace and prosperity. They all the signatories, the Agreement paved the way for a broader reading of its purpose in the political system and introduced its intangible "spirit". The promotion of several constituent peoples of the country and the primary position for the Macedonian citizens as a majority is a democratic achievement worth noting. It stresses the rights of the citizens accompanied with the rights of the communities, making the ethnicities equally important pillars of the country. However, the list of communities is incomplete. The term "others" excludes more than 20 registered minorities, which in the subsequent years expressed their grievances of not being part of the constituent conglomerate. The second structural transformation is the voting procedure, which established a new form of minority veto. Amendment 18, together with amendments that regulate the spheres of interest to the communities, added an additional obstacle to the absolute majority vote (50% of the representatives plus one), and the qualified majority vote (two-thirds of the representatives). According to these amendments, "a law that affects the communities of the country shall require a two-thirds majority vote [or an
Constitutional amendments
absolute vote] of the total number of representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of representatives who belong to the communities not in the majority of the population of were to ensure that there could be no "tyranny of the majority" when the Assembly decides on questions that are sensitive to the ethnic minorities.
Some scholars feared that this amendment could turn into a "tyranny of the minorities" (Skaric, Siljanovska-Davkova 2009 ). However, this fear was proved unfounded, because the new voting procedure has enabled an inclusive debate among representatives on sensitive issues, but has not caused major blockades on crucial issues.
The third substantial sphere where the Ohrid Framework Agreement brought a change was the use of languages on central and local level.
According Amendment 5 of the Constitution, the official language of the country is Macedonian, which shall be used within the whole territory of the country and international correspondence. In addition, any language spoken by 20 percent of the population is also an official language according to that article of the constitution. The 20 percent threshold, a function of demographics and not of symbolic recognition of status, meant that Albanian was the only other language which was granted a tacit officialization. The use of the second official language was to be in spheres of concern for the minorities, such as: issuing personal documents, for the implementation of the Agreement in subsequent years, and to derive some lessons for similar endeavors.
Implications of the constitutional amendments
The implications of the constitutional amendments are a deeply contested issue among the Macedonian and Albanian population and political elites.
In political discussions, the agreement is seen as a driver for beneficial reforms by some of the Albanian political entities, while others stress its inability enforce the demanded set of transformations. In the Macedonian political sphere the Agreement is seen rather deterministically, from two extreme viewpoints. One percentage of the population view it as an act of treason, and others have considered OFA a frame for building a sustainable multiethnic society with equal treatment for every citizen.
However, the complexity of the Ohrid Framework Agreement demands a detailed and multi-pronged analytical perspective. Therefore, in order to draw practical solutions it is essential to understand the formal and substantial implications of OFA.
In perspective, the implementation of both Agreement's articles and principles is a crucial criterion for the Macedonian integration in the European Union and NATO. According to the European Commission,
"[t]he Ohrid Framework Agreement remains an essential element for democracy and rule of law in the country" (EC Progress Report 2012).
Therefore, the implementation of the Agreement is the mechanism through which Macedonia can adhere to the EU Copenhagen political criteria, which require "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" 13 . By strengthening the minority rights, the society has embraced a dynamic approach of building modern multicultural democratic structure. The
Assembly has undertaken a plethora of measures to protect minorities with a positive long-term effect on their integration. Today, it is clear that the agreement has fulfilled the primary purpose -to establish peace and to end the violent conflict. By providing inclusive institutional procedures, it has offered basis for development of human rights and transformation of conflict.
However, there are three debatable aspects in terms of the procedural complexities in the Agreement and its formal endurance. Firstly, a political agreement written in English was used to amend a constitution adopted in Macedonian, creating serious implementation deficiencies. Secondly, the Agreement forced popularly elected representatives in the Assembly to vote according to the decisions of the signatories. Thirdly, OFA implicitly established a leeway for armed groups in the future to pressure for constitutional rearrangement.
Ohrid Agreement's only authentic version is the one written in American English 14 . In that sense, when drafting the provisions, peace negotiators did not fully take into account the differences between legal terms in the continental and common law systems. In accordance with the 1991 Constitution, the Ohrid Agreement had to be drafted and adopted in through institutionalization of the conflict, the agreement, by honoring rebels' demands, allowed proposals reached with violence to be put into constitutional amendments. This set forth a negative example, using which future rebels and/or terrorists could demand systemic political changes.
"The problem appears when it is assessed that the conflict is cost-effective so the nationalist requests are enhanced". (Vasović 2003: 43) In that sense, Such progress would be driven by the innovative measures in the private sector, which should remain the primary employer. Therefore, it is essential for OFA to inspire this trend, not to be its counterpart. mono-ethnic educational approach hinders social cohesion from early age, and decreases the personal contact. Some argue that "in many cases, the formal organization of power along identity or ethnic lines seems to entrench the divisions that fueled the conflict, rather than ameliorate them, and divisions appear to become radicalized during the power-sharing phase" (Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth, 2006) . Essentially, what Macedonia needs is an inclusive concept for all the citizens, which accepts and promotes different nationalities. The resolution of the conflict would go beyond the creation of a nation-free or bi-national state, and demand for multiethnicization of politics and policy making on all levels.
The simplest solution to separate the "hostile" ethnic groups that guarantees a "negative" peace (based on "ethnicization" of politics and ghettoization of citizens from different ethnic backgrounds), according to some scholars, is a quick, but not a qualitatively satisfying solution (Vankovska 2014) . Therefore, the Agreement aimed but failed to target all the roots causes of the conflict, such as the structural injustice and violence which were present in the societal context in the 1990s. Instead, it promoted the belief that a constitutional re-arrangement by itself would automatically eliminate the conflict in Macedonia. On the contrary, the expansion of its spirit way beyond the aspirations of peace agreements coupled with all-encompassing goals of development and international integration, protracted as well as hindered its implementation.
Going forward -17 years after Ohrid
This year marks the 17 th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
That allows for scholars and practitioners to evaluate Agreement's mediumterm outcomes. As it has been analyzed in the article, the implications of the Ohrid Framework Agreement transplanted into Constitutional amendments are complex and multi-pronged. These amendments initiated multivalent and diverse processes, which were contextualized by the particularities of the Macedonian society and political considerations.
Even though those processes make devising a generalized conclusion difficult, the ex post facto analysis allows for some lessons to be drawn for future post-conflict constitutional redesigning.
Today, the Ohrid Agreement is one of the pillars of the Macedonian multiethnic social reality. All major political parties' platforms entail the goal for Macedonia to become an integral part of the European Union and NATO. In this sense, the Agreement represents a criterion for success of the reforms and a protector of minorities' rights. However, the Agreement has intrinsic flaws which hinder the process of its own implementation. As has been analyzed, the Agreement cannot be fully absorbed in the political system, neither by the criterion of its goals, nor by its over-reaching spirit which allows for free interpretation by political actors.
Several implications should be taken into consideration. First, in procedural sense, foreign terminology of agreements creates difficulties in the implementation of the provisions into the domestic legal system.
Therefore, the language in peace agreements that entail constitutional redesigning should reflect the legalistic practice from the original constitutional framework. This can be done swiftly if the process includes local experts who would consult the process, adding value to the final draft. Even more, a direct transplantation of agreement's provisions into constitutional amendments undermines some procedural principles, such as, the independence of elected representatives, their right to vote and the process of law adoption. As was discussed in the article, agreements could, implicitly, institute a new harmful constitution amending procedure, through force and external pressure, contrary to the accepted principles of modern democracies. In that sense, agreements which purpose is to bring about developmental change, should not infringe established liberal principles. Peace agreements should set the stage for a process of institutionalized constitution redesigning, and serve as a driver for development of reforms and progressive democratic principles. Therefore, peace agreements should follow a phased approach, in which there will be steps for averting violence, institutionalizing conflict resolution, and forging a forum for constitutional redesigning.
Second, constitutional-institutional engineers should set the goals of the peace agreement realistically. If the approach of the peace process is mono-dimensional -stopping escalation and freezing violence -then internationally drafted agreements would suffice. However, if the goals include democratic development, internal and international integration, promotion of civil society and protection of minorities, peace agreements should take into consideration the intangible issues of political folklore, emotional tensions and historical imprints. Thus, if the social context is misunderstood or neglected in the post-conflict design, it can put ethnic lenses to its reading and implementation. That could load the implementation with emotions, prejudices, fear and stigma. For some authors, this happens because "…interests of implementers and evaluators are superficial and temporary, whereas the problems are long-lasting" (Orlovic 2015) . Therefore, it is important for the agreement to entail realistic view of the capabilities of the affected society to substantially implement the provisions that have been negotiated. Then, the process of drafting and implementation of the agreement should include international actors, but also local scholars, experts, interest groups and societal stakeholders. In that manner, the process would allow for ownership both
for the text of the agreement and for its implementation. The success of the arrangement can then be assessed by the ability of the societal actors to legally, politically and developmentally adhere to its provisions.
Third, if an agreement entails goals that go beyond achieving peace, then it should provide opportunities for conflict transformation -institutional mechanisms that transform the violent conflict into a developmental one.
A constitutional reform cannot be successful if it does not set a base for dealing with the immediate triggers of the conflict and acute symptoms.
In that sense, agreements should provide avenues for functional and structural power sharing, not a declarative power divide. The simplistic approach to separate and isolate the powers between conflicting parties leads to divergence. The gap that would be created leads to creating a society of bare tolerance, not of acceptance of the differences. In that sense, mediators' prowess would come to light if agreements are designed to target the conflict root causes and envision their management.
Authors claim that a pure consociational or integrative approach cannot be implemented in practice, and pose dangers to multiethnic societies Lebanon which relied heavily on Lijphard's consociationalism, or Uganda and Fiji, which models were largely based on the integrative approach.
Therefore, the answer in designing post-conflict constitutional systems should ask for meaningful power sharing, one that includes avenues for cooperation between the sides. Consociational models would set the basis for power sharing between the conflicting groups. In addition, the integrative governance would surpass the differences between the groups, by promoting cooperation in achieving the common goals. Those avenues would be the added value to the system that would lead to developmental changes. In essence, they should include full acceptance and promotion of ethnic diversity, extensive use of all languages, the creation of joint educational programs focusing on multiculturalism and inclusion of all minorities in the societal system.
The purpose of multiethnic societies is to promote and protect diversity, That can be achieved if the Ohrid Framework Agreement is seen as a driver for the creation of a functioning multiethnic society oriented towards development and innovation, which respects the languages, the symbols, and the cultural heritage of all its members. Finally, the legal framework should assist the building of a societal system in which all ethnicities would sense their belonging and build their future.
